Saturday night's marquee matchup of CC vs. King Felix in Seattle is quite appealing!

[1] CC vs. King Felix?/ Damn, am going to miss that one...thanks the gods for the mlb.com archive!

When Gardner came in for Teixeira, I was already bracing for the Girardi Special (TM) where he puts in a pinch runner but then refuses to put on any kind of play, so the speedy guy does exactly what the slow guy would have done (nothing) with the added plus of getting your hopes up and then dashed

I was pleasantly surprised.

I thought Jeter's bunt was a good move in that situation. With a man on second, the third basemen wasn't playing in, so a bunt to third would've been a clean base hit. He just didn't push the ball far enough to third to get it passed Weaver. Good try.

And hey. Have faith in El Capitaine. He must know something we don't about laying down the occasional bunt.

[1] Cool. That will be the Sunday morning game for us. Now I need some way to convince my wife that it's a VERY important game and I must watch it instead of cleaning house. Maybe something about Ichiro going for another record. Most 2010-hit seasons in history or something.

[4] I agree. I'm not in the "Jeter Should Never Bunt" camp. He's probably the best bunter on the team. When the situation calls for it, why not? Besides, in the postseason, against superior pitching, they won't always be able to count on the big hit.

[3] That was my fear as well. The only way to justify using the PR was by having him try to steal 3B with one out. What really worried me was it seemed odd to wait until after the Arod AB, which made me think it wasn't a well thoughtout move.

While that decision was justified by the subsequent strategy, Girardi gave us two glimpses of why the Yankees will be at a disadvantage. The first was the Jeter bunt. Under no circumtances does it make sense to give away an out with a batter sporting an OPS+ around 130, especially after seeing how poor Damon looked against Weaver. Tex bailed him out in the end, but that isn;t always going to happen.

The second poor move was not using Hughes in the 7th. Even worse, Albaledejo was warming for Vlad, which is mind boggling. As things worked out, Coke got two outs (with some help) and Hughes had a hiccup, but the outcome doesn't justify the decision.

The Yankees can't try to match the small ball approach of the Angels, who actually score a good amount of runs. Just because Sciosa bunts with his backup catcher doesn't mean Girardi has to bunt with his Hall of Game short stop. Small ball is useful in the right situation, not as a rule. When you are down by 1 in the middle innings and have 1 and 2 set up for your 1, 2 and 3 hitters, you don't give away outs. The Yankees have a big inning offense. Throttling it back to make a point wont win games. Similarly, if the Yankees are going to throttle Hughes back to a one inning pitcher, they will be further mitigating their advantages.

In a short series, one game lost because of Girardi's poor game management could be deadly. It's a shame that possibility looms so large.

[7] i'm with you completely on the 7th inning machinations william, and remarked so on the game thread.

i can actually understand girardi's logic a bit with waiting until after the arod ab to put in the pr. you don't really want to take tex out of the game. he wanted to see if alex got a pitch to drive in which case sal fasano could have been on 2nd and scored. once alex walked, you have several dp threats coming up and you want to get to 3rd to increase the odds of scoring and so he decided that was the time to put in the pr - i am okay with this logic.

[0] Due to a relatively small number of tough big losses and the vagaries of human perception, the Angels have become a larger-than-life antagonist in my mind...

They were, however, the only team to have a winning record against theTorre era Yankees, and they destroyed them in the 2002 ALDS (when the rotation was still quite talented), so I think the Angels have earned whatever stature they have had against the Yankees.

As for Girardi's use of Gardner as a pinch runner, with the reported possibility of both Gardner and Guzman being on the postseason roster, we can probably expect an increase in counterfactual smallballesque managerial maneuvering in the playoffs.

[7] Not sure Girardi calls for the bunt there with Jeter. Could just be Jeter's decision.

When he bunted to break his 0-12 slide, he said he didn't know he was going to bunt until the pitch came.

I think you've got to chalk that bunt up to Jeter. Maybe he's got some ingrained lesson about bunting held over from Little league. Who knows. I like it. He's got the speed to reach base on a clean bunt against a deep defense. And it keeps the other team on their toes. And, whatever the reason, his thinking about the bunt is also what leads him to inside-out fastballs on the inside of the plate. He's got some peculiar approaches, but he's remained very successful.

[10] Based on its placement, last night's bunt was intended solely as a sacrifice. Outs are too precious to give away when you are as good a hitter as Jeter is.

[0] I do not like the LA Angels of Anahiem, C-A. I do not like them, Emma the recapper of the day.

[11] Jeter is a great baseball player. Jeter - based on his propensity for giving up outs via bunts, at times when its foolish to do is - is not a great baseball tactician. Swing away, dude - no one wants you or expects you to be Phil Rizzuto when you have the bat in your hands.

Jeter calls his own bunts and has been doing it long before Girardi got here. I wouldbe surprised if Girardi has ever given Jeter the bunt sign.

Jeter did the bunt on his own.
What an idiot!
What a moron!
Doesn't this guy have ANY baseball knowledge?
Doesn't this guy have ANY baseball experience?

How could he bunt when 61.32% of bloggers think it's a abd move?

I'm fine with Jeter bunting now and then. It probably helps him steal hits through drawn in infields if nothing else. But I am probably wrong and I am ok with that too.

I think the bunt in the fifth inning is a reasonable play. I didn't like it at the time (too early in the game), but I now think it's marginal, either call is reasonable.
For one thing, it isn't "giving away an out". It's trading an out for an extra base for each of two runners. You get something in return for the out. Second, Jeter does hit into a lot of DPs. And third, there is a small but significant chance that Jeter reaches safely on the bunt.
The successful bunt increased the Yankees' chance of scoring one or two runs, decreased their chance of scoring more than two. In the fifth inning of a game when you're down by a run, this is generally not quite worth it -- in the seventh inning it's just about break-even. And, giving up Jeter's at-bat is worse than giving up an average hitter's at-bat. But the other factors I mentioned just about compensate, so I don't hate the bunt.

Oh, and I am also okay with Seamus' being wrong, if he is.

From 1999-2002, the average run expectancy for having runners on 1st and 2nd with no outs was 1.573. It was 1.467 with runners on 2nd and 3rd with one out. So I'm not sure how the bunt is a good tradeoff.

14. Old Yank, you may mock but the fact is that the sac bunt gives away an out. Jeter is a top hitter, and by bunting, he pushes the responsibility for getting the run home down the order while also reducing the odds that it will happen by creating an out. Nice that Teix came through with the wall-banger, but the bunt did not create any additional advantage are the runner probably would have scored from first. Jeter's a great player, but that doesn't mean the strategy he employs is always the best.

[18] Because when you're behind by two runs, the first two runs you can score in the inning are worth more (in terms of win expectancy) than the runs you could score after that. Simple enough.

[19] No, it does not "give away an out". People keep saying that, but it isn't true. You trade the out for something valuable, namely, moving up the runners. And, there was a significant chance that Jeter could reach safely.
Still, I completely agree with you that we don't need to believe it was a good move just because Jeter chose it!

[20] What?

[21] As you said, a small but significant chance that Jeter reaches safely on the bunt. Seems to me that a .335 hitter has an even better chance of banging one through to the outfield, although that also comes with the double-play risk. Your point about the advantage of trading an out for gaining the extra base makes sense, but I guess a lot of us would prefer to see this lineup swinging away rather than trading bases for outs. With Girardi at the helm, I think we can expect to see a far bit of small-ball strategy through the playoffs, whether we like it or not.

[22] I meant, when you're behind by one run.

The difference in win expectancy is very big when you go from one run back to tying the game. It's very big when you go from a tie to a one run lead. It's smaller when you go from a one run lead to a two run lead.

To decide whether a tactic is a good idea, you have to look at win expectancy, not expected runs. This is really obvious in the bottom of the ninth in a tie game, but it's true in all situations.

[23] I would prefer to see nothing "traded" for an out. Except in certain circumstances, that's a trade a hitter of Jeter's caliber almost always loses.

Jeter's OBP is .397 - he avoids making outs 4 out of 10 times. That's damn good: second best on the Yanks, 7th best in the AL. Yes, there is an advantage gained by moving the runners up a base - but its a small advantage, because it puts another out on the books.

If Jeter got a hit of any kind, or a walk - and he does one of those things, 4 out of every 10 times, more often than all but 6 other AL players - that's a significantly greater advantage, that does not put another out on the books.

If its the 8th inning and the game is tied, or the Yanks are down by one, than the equation changes all together. But in the 5th inning, with 2 on and no outs, its foolish.

[24] But how do you increase the win expectancy except by maximizing expected runs in any given situation?

I would not like the Angels in a box
I would not like them with a fox.
I worry about them more than the Red Sox.

Joba looked good enough, against a very good team.
The Yankees were able to get the win, battling hard and even executing small ball against their current nemesis.

So I'm happy.

[8] The only reason I don't buy that logic is because my pinch running, you are essentially saying that you think 1 run will be enough (wise assumption with Mariano). So, if you run and Arod does go into the gap, you are no worse off than you wanted to be. Of course, Arod could also hit a blistering line drive to the outfield, in which case you would be better of with Gardner on the bases, especially because, as you noted, several DP threats were looming (i.e., having 1st and 3rd would carried some risk).

[10] It wouldn't shock me if Jeter bunted on his own, so of course, it shouldn't shock Girardi. Therefore, he has to tell him not to bunt. Besides, Jeter had a failed attempt, so even if he was taken by surprise, there was time to make an adjustment.

[14] Fantastic analysis.

[29] Agreed, but will Girardi tell Jeter not to bunt? I wonder . . .

[24] I still don't get it. As stated in [26], maximizing the runs you score when presented with the opportunity increases your win expectancy. So, if giving away an out actually REDUCES your chances of scoring two runs (the deficit at the time), then how can it improve your win expectancy to do so? I realize that the chances of scoring only 1 run go up, but in the 5th inning the Yankees shouldn't be limiting themselves in that way.

[17] yes, I'm hoping we can all agree on that.

[27] Joba was a little more aggressive, but I would like to see him be even more so. Also, I really hoping to see better velocity and break on the slider in these shorter starts, but it still remains elusive. I am still somewhat concerned about Joba's ability to be an ace.

[31] That's a good point, but then again, would Jeter really be offended if his manager tells him I think you are so good that I want you to swing away?

[35] I would think, if Girardi (wisely) put it as complementary as you did, that Jeter of course would not be offended.

But no athlete is as good as Jeter is without having a bit of an ego, and he is "The Captain" - which is why we could both imagine Girardi saying nothing to Jeter.

This is tough, because we are guessing, a lot. We know nothing of Jeter and Girardi's relationship. For all we know, Jeter gladly takes such advice from Girardi.

As stated in [26], maximizing the runs you score when presented with the opportunity increases your win expectancy.

False, in general.
Here's an extreme illustration. Bottom of the ninth, tie game, nobody out, runner on second. The win expectancy is .807. Sacrifice that runner to third, now there's one out. Win expectancy is now .830. So it increased, although the expected runs drops.

The reason, as I thought I said pretty plainly, is that each run that contributes to run expectancy is not worth the same as each other run. In a tie game in the ninth, this is very obvious, since a second run you could score is worth absolutely nothing. But it's always true that the run that gets you from a tie score to a one run lead is worth less (in win expectancy) than a run that gets you from a one run lead to a two run lead. And then the next run is worth even less, and the next run even less, and so on.

[25] Shaun, it's not foolish in that situation. It's a very close call. The run expectancy, after all, drops only by a tenth of a run. Factor in the greater value of runs #1 and #2 when you're down a run, plus the chance that Jeter could reach safely, and it's an extremely close call.
True, the move is in general more likely to make sense in a later inning. And if I were making the calls, I wouldn't have had him bunt (even if it's a very tiny disadvantage, why give away a few thousandths of a chance of winning?). But I think it's a too-close-to-worry-about decision.

[37] Your general example is false because in a walk off situation you can not score as many runs as possible. Once the lead run scores, you win the game (unless it's a HR). So, using such an example to illustrate your point fails on a context basis. Similarly, applying the law of diminishing returns without context is equally misleading.

[38] Not to belabor the point, but it IS foolish in THAT situation. You keep referencing Win Expectancy without taking into account the context of the game. Giving away outs in the fifth inning is rarely a good strategy, but it's especially bad when playing against a good offense in a game in which you are already in the bullpen.

[39] So what? The batter could indeed homer, and in any case the run expectancy values ignore this fact, so when someone (Rich, say) reports run expectancy values from a situation that assumes that the inning could be a big inning, with a long rally. So the run expectancy values given by the matrices do not correlate perfectly with win expectancy.
In any case, I can give you a top-of-the-ninth example if you want. It was just an example.
The law of diminishing returns for runs always has context. In a tie game or with a lead, the (win expectancy) value of runs always diminishes. That's the context.

[40] Don't agree. When you still have Hughes and Mo in the bullpen, runs are at a relative premium in a very close game.
And, it's not giving away an out. It's trading an out to advance runners.

I pretty much agree with RIYank. Which creates a bit of a dilemna since we are both ok with me being wrong. oh well. :)

[41] Win and run expectancy are good general guides, but they do not supercede the context of the game. That's why bunting with Mathis makes more sense than bunting with Jeter. Both metrics are useful tools, but they are rendered meaningless when applied blindly to a specific situation.

[42] This event took place in the 5th inning! If Girardi was willing to use Hughes and Mo for one inning, you might have a point, but that's not the case. The reason why your argument fails is because the Yankees had to rely on Coke (and almost Albaledejo) to protect a lead. That's context. When your starter only goes 4 innings, such circumstances are not unforeseen.

In case anyone wants it, here's a top of the ninth example, in a tie game. The numbers are: bases occupied, outs, win expectancy for the visiting team (at bat).

2nd, 0, .672
3rd, 1, .679

1st & 2nd, 0, .703
2nd & 3rd, 1, .719

In both situations, a successful sac increases win expectancy even though it decreases expected runs. This is because the first two runs the team could score have greater value than the runs they could score after that in a rally.

[43] Hm. Are you okay with me being wrong? Because I'm pretty sure I'm not.

the decision to bunt does not automatically make it a successful bunt. i rarely hear or read analysis of bunting that includes all of the bunts that end up as pop outs, double plays, force outs of the lead runner or 0-2 hitting counts. or maybe for that matter, errors that advance the runners and don't record an out.

i usually like to think to myself, if i was on the defensive team, would i be glad they were bunting here? at least some of the time that he bunts, i would be glad.

still, i think it's wrong to paint absolute pictures. it's not always wrong, and it's not always right. and i think joe feels jeter has earned the right to make those calls for himself and trusts his judgment even if it might differ from his own. if i were manager, i would certainly tell jeter i would like him to swing away all the time, but i would still leave the decision up to him as it is clearly part of his game and style.

[46] yeah i'm ok with that.

[47] I agree, I'd like to see that analysis too. My impression is that it is somewhat uncommon but not so uncommon as to be negligible that the bunt is popped up, the fielders make an error, it's a perfect bunt for a hit, or even that the bunt rolls foul and the batter is left in a worse situation at 0-1 or 0-2.

And I also agree with you about leaving the decision to Jeter, especially because there are lots of situations where the purely statistical call is going to be a very close one. Suppose you're giving away a percentage point of win expectancy, theoretically speaking. Jeter's hunches and the benefit to his baseball psychology might well be worth quite a bit more than that in the long run.

[49] i don't think it's uncommon to screw up the bunt - especially for most yankee bunters. jeter however, seems to be an excellent bunter, so he does usually get it done.

over the long haul, jeter bunting to set up damon, bernie, arod, sheffield, oneill, etc, is a sign of respect for his teammates as well. jeter showing he has confidence that he can set them up and they will deliver. again, it may not always be right, but there is a value when the captain and most respected member of the team gives you the tip of the cap like that.

[45] RIYank, I really appreciate the in-depth explanations and examples of win expectancy, because to be honest, I know very little about it (outside of how it plays into BP's WXRL stat in a very basic way). This has been very illuminating.

I've never thought very much of win expectancy, because as far as I'm aware, its not a very good predictive tool, but is a very good illustrative tool (or is that win probability added, WPA? Is there a difference?). It reminds me of ERA, which I really don't care for either . . . Maybe that's not the case, and maybe I'm too closed-minded on the matter from years of having "making outs is bad" on the brain. I have to think about this more.

In the grand scheme of things, Jeter bunting in the 5th inning of a game, with two on and none out, in the regular season, is pretty meaningless. And I don't think I care much if the decision is left to him. There is something to be said for instincts.

But if he does it in a playoff game, I am going to be very pissed off.

I think we're missing the point. Weaver was having a good day and Jeter is owned by Weaver: 2 for 17 for a BA of .117.

Jeter's AVERAGE on base percentage is irrelevant. He made a tactical decision that his chances of advancing the Yankee cause were higher with a low incremental gain, but with a high probability of occurring. Add on to that Jeter has hit into a goodly number of DPs, and that it was looking like a low scoring game where a single run has a higher chance of changing the game outcome, and I think it was a great decision.

I also strongly believe that the statistical approach of applying an average probable outcome (of win expectancy) in which you simple stamp the middle of the bell curve onto every decision is deeply flawed. The more parameters you can add, the less the center of the curve will provide the best guidance. In this case, Jeter's BA against is of huge significance and totally ignored by win expectancy.

[52] Just to follow up with some info that doesn't support my case as strongly: Jeter has walked four times against Weaver for a cumulative OBP of .286, which, while bad, doesn't make the decision to bunt quite as black as white. Also, Jeter has never GIDP against Weaver.

Everyone's over in the new thread, but just in case:
I agree with you about Win Probability Added, Shaun. Maybe to look at how 'valuable' the player was (for MVP or something), it's okay, but it's a bad tool for predictions. (I have a view about why this is, but it's a long story.)
Win Expectancy is the ultimate stat, though, for decision making within a game. In my opinion, I guess I should add. The ultimate measure of any choice is whether it increases or decreases your chance of winning, given everything you know about the situation. (Of course, this isn't quite true -- you don't leave your young pitcher in too long in a regular season game in Sept. with an eight game Division lead, because you're concerned about other things than winning that game. But in general the aim is to win the game.)
The Win Expectancy tables, as everyone is fond of pointing out, do not take into account the particular personnel of the game. That's okay, they're a good starting point. Then you try to make adjustments for whether the batter is good at bunting, what his OBP is, who's coming up next, and what pitchers you're likely to see in the rest of the game. That part's not going to be very exact. But it's very helpful to have a solid "generic batter, generic pitchers" analysis, I think. For instance, it's very interesting that there are so few situations where bunting increases win expectancy given generic batters and pitchers. That fact turned out to be extremely important in changing what's thought of as good baseball strategy. Stealing bases, too, of course.

Yankster, what's really flawed is relying on the tiny sample of Jeter's PAs against Weaver. That really doesn't make sense.

Also, doesn't Jeter's own feeling about his likelihood of getting a hit or bouncing into two count for something? I mean, numbers are great for what they are, but ultimately, isn't it about the athlete's ability to execute in a given situation? Maybe Jeter just felt less than comfortable swinging in that spot for whatever reason and bunted because he felt more comfortable about executing a bunt than in getting a hit.

I guess I just find it a little frustrating that numbers are bandied about as if there are no human beings behind them. Numbers can't account for who fought with his wife the previous day, whose kids are giving him a hard time, who didn't quite get enough sleep the night before, who's coming down with his annual case of SAD...

In other words, I think it's myopic to argue situations like this based on nothing more than statistics, as if we're playing a computer game.

There needs to be a way to use BOTH statistics AND whatever else--intuition?--in making determinations about "The Right Thing to Do" in any given situation.

No?